Bonus Predictions Doubleheader

The Oregon State Senate Walkout and Ukraine's Counter-Offensive

“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” - Yogi Berra

In today’s update, we have a doubleheader exploring the possible next steps in the Oregon State Senate and in Ukraine.

Oregon’s Wandering State Senators

First, a confession - I thought this would be resolved before any serious consequences accrued to the absent State Senators. Instead, as of the time of writing, four have crossed the Measure 113 threshold of 10 unexcused absences and will be unable to run for re-election - Senators Linthicum (Klamath Falls), Boquist (Dallas), Bonham (Welches), and Hayden (Fall River). Six additional Senators will follow tomorrow unless a resolution is reached.

Senator Cedric Hayden

This is a big historical aberration, as most State Senators famously go out of their way to promote good relationships. Indeed, it was a frequent joke in the Oregon House that, “The House has principles, while the Senate has relationships.” This sea change merits a quick review of Measure 113 and the likely path forward.

Senate President Rob Wagner

Measure 113. Measure 113 provides that legislators who miss 10 sessions without an excuse are ineligible to run for re-election (or election to the other chamber) for the term immediately following their current term. It does allow election thereafter. The measure passed almost 70/30 in 2022. While it will certainly be challenged, it is likely to be upheld by the courts. As a constitutional amendment, it would likely only be struck down if it conflicted with federal law in some way.

Logo for the Yes on 113 Campaign

What’s Next. In one way or another, all conflicts end at the bargaining table, even if the only item on the table is an instrument of surrender. Pragmatically, if nothing else, the state budget expires on June 30, 2023. Absent a continuing resolution or a passed budget, the state government effectively shuts down at that point. The likely outcomes are the “zero option” of no action, a limited compromise to only pass a budget, and a full agreement that passes both a budget and policy bills.

1. The “Zero Option”. The thing the Oregon Legislature does best is nothing. Without any action, the state government will shut down on July 1. The Governor would then call a special session for the purpose of passing a budget, to which the absent Senators may or may not voluntarily attend. If they do not, the Governor may reconsider her opposition to using the State Police to compel attendance. While the Legislature may address whatever it likes in a special session, regardless of the limits of the governor’s call, it is likely that they would just pass a budget.

2. A Limited Compromise. Either before or after a government shutdown, the Legislature could pass a budget, but decline to pass any policy bills. As this would effectively kill many Democratic priorities, any such deal would likely only happen after all the Republican State Senators were disqualified from re-election and would not involve an “amnesty” for them that retroactively excused their absences.

3. A Full Agreement. The Senate President has offered to pass at least some unnamed Republican policy bills in exchange for the Senators returning to conduct the remainder of the session’s business. He has ruled out a “kill list” of bills the Republicans insist die to guarantee their return, despite their request to eliminate 20 or more Democratic bills. If there is a deal, it is likely that it would include both Democratic and Republican policy priorities. Any deal may or may not include a retroactive excusal for the absent Senators. The legality of a retroactive recusal would likely be legally suspect under the new language of the Oregon Constitution, but the courts are unlikely to interfere in the matter.

One wild card to consider is whether the Governor will offer a compromise on her appointment of the next Secretary of State. The appointee must be a Democrat, but some are more likely to be acceptable to Republicans than others.

Having been wrong once, I won’t speculate which is the most likely outcome. I do expect that pressures will mount enough that a budget will eventually pass, but it may only do so after a shutdown. One unintended consequence of Measure 113 is that legislators who have already triggered it have no incentive to compromise beyond their sense of duty to the public. Let’s all keep our fingers crossed for something that at least keeps the state government running.

Ukraine

Sound trumpets! Let our bloody colours wave.
And either victory, or else a grave.
William Shakespeare, Henry VI Part 3, Act 2, Scene 2

It’s difficult to predict the outcome of the long-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive. As above, I’ll give a quick disclaimer here that, despite spending 28 years in the military, 24 years of my time was as a JAG, not a combat arms officer. (My first four years were in the infantry.) We do know certain things about the nature of offensive operations and the possible outcomes.

Click on the above to go to a site with the most recent updates from Ukraine.

Attack Strategies. An attacking military force may engage in a direct assault of the opposing force’s lines or seek a way around them to approach from behind. While many deride the “hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle” approach, it can be successful if fully resourced. The “front line” of the conflict is 600 miles long, meaning Russian lines are thin in many places. To succeed in a direct assault, the Ukrainian military would need to create a local force superiority, ideally of about 12 to 1 in manpower and equipment (and especially critical equipment like tanks and engineering platforms). That’s a challenge in a conflict where modern technology gives both sides a greater ability to detect concentrations of troops. Once a breach is established, the attacking force needs high mobility forces to exploit the penetration, disrupt logistical support lines, and attack enemy forces from behind.

Alternatively, an attacking force may seek to bypass the strength of the defense by going around it. This can involve something as simple as a flanking maneuver or as complicated as an amphibious or airborne assault. Once established behind the defense, the first task is generally to attack the enemy from the rear to allow resupply through a ground route. After that, it proceeds much like a direct assault. While a bypass operation is possible, it is relatively unlikely. Russian forces have entrenched almost the entire line of contact on land. The lack of air superiority makes an airborne operation extremely risky and the Ukrainian forces lack a substantial “blue water” navy. One caveat to this is that Ukraine does have a number of “brown water” (riverine) boats that could allow an attack across the Dnieper River, but the destruction of all the bridges across the river means that a successful amphibious operation would immediately be confronted with resupply challenges.

In military strategy, we try to strike the enemy’s “center of gravity” - essentially their critical weakness. For Ukraine, their center of gravity is the western alliance supplying their military. While Russian actions are unlikely to weaken the alliance, Ukraine has to avoid undermining their own support. Practically speaking, that means they have to avoid major incursions into Russia (or Belorussia) with ground forces, the use of western weapons on Russian soil, and any use of weapons in Russian territories that kills or injures civilians. That effectively eliminates bypassing the Russian lines to the north as an option.

Courtesy of Brady Africk

The Russian center of gravity is logistics. Dictatorships breed corruption and corruption strikes military logistics hard. Between diversion of resources, low stocks, and a failure to field an adequate force of critical logistical equipment like forklifts, Russian troops can exhaust their supplies of ammunition and equipment quickly. The Ukrainian military capitalizes on this through deep strikes at logistical hubs and making resupply routes targets in the campaign. While nothing can make a direct assault easy, interrupting resupply of the opposing force lets an offensive force effectively attrit the defense through resource starvation, rather than direct fire. Much of the speculation about the Ukrainian objectives centers around cutting the rail resupply lines through Melitopol (or in other areas in occupied southern Ukraine) as this would complicate resupply both of forces in that area and in Crimea. If the rail line is cut and the Kerch bridge is interdicted by fire, Ukraine could play a longer game of resource starvation of the entire peninsula before attempting to retake it.

Sorting the wheat from the chaff in discussions about the counter-offensive can be difficult. For instance, while providing F-16s to Ukraine will help them in the future, they could not arrive and be fielded quickly enough to establish air superiority for the coming offensive and the high cost would “draw down” the funds Congress has allocated disproportionate to their importance. Any counter-offensive this year will occur under disputed skies. Conversely, tanks, air defense, engineering equipment, and especially artillery shells represent critical capabilities without which any counter-attack will likely fail.

US F-16s are effective, but expensive and would come too late for this year’s offensive.

Regardless of how the offensive proceeds on the tactical level, there are three likely outcomes - failure, success in southern Ukraine, but not Crimea, and a Russian military collapse.

1. Failure. The current state of military technology favors the defense. Defending requires less advanced training and a well-informed defender can move forces around to bolster attacks on weak positions when the intent of the attacking force is clear. To be blunt, the western alliance wants to back a winner. Voices advocating an end to or reduction of support to Ukraine will get louder if the counter-offensive fails or has minimal gains. For this reason, some pragmatic thinkers believe waiting until Ukraine has received and fielded all the promised equipment is a better strategy than an early attack.

2. Success in the South, But Not Crimea. A counter-attack that creates a defensible permanent position east of the Dnieper and cuts Russian supply lines significantly advances the Ukrainian cause, even if it does not end the conflict. This might look like crossing the Dnieper near Kherson, establishing a ground resupply route, and blocking off the Crimean Peninsula or pushing through in the Zaporizhya region to re-take Melitopol. While such an approach looks small on the map, it effectively separates the Russians into two fronts, complicating their resupply and reinforcement. In turn, this puts time on the Ukrainian side.

3. Russian Collapse. Military collapse is best described as Hemingway described how bankruptcy proceeds, “Gradually, then suddenly.” While it is notoriously difficult to predict, most militaries eventually reach a point where the drip-drip of losses cascades into a flood as critical enabling capabilities fail. Troops that are not resupplied or who can’t rotate off the line will eventually flee, not fight. It doesn’t matter how well fortified the neck of the Crimean Peninsula is if there’s no one there to defend it. If this happens, look for Ukraine to retake all of its legally-recognized pre-2014 territory.

While these represent the three most likely outcomes, there are some unlikely ones as well. President Putin will probably not use nuclear weapons. While logistics is the Russian operational center of gravity, their strategic center of gravity is regime survival. It appears that China has made it clear that they will not continue to support Russia if they use these weapons. On the alliance side, while it is unlikely that we would retaliate with nuclear weapons, we would almost certainly respond with our own conventional long-range weapons. Putin is aware that both of these would endanger his own political survival.

Ukraine will not give up Crimea, nor will the western alliance force him to. Should Ukraine regain all its non-Crimean territory, it can effectively render Crimea indefensible over time. While some alliance partners will probably walk away from directly supporting Ukraine at that point, sanctions will still be in place and the US and UK will likely continue their support.

US troops will likely not engage in open combat with Russian troops. With a reliable proxy in Ukraine, the US has no interest in fielding its own non-covert forces. Indirect and (likely) covert support will continue until at least January 2025 and likely beyond that if President Biden wins re-election. However, any attack by Russia on the US or US servicemembers would immediately change this.

My crystal ball remains cloudy. A modestly successful counter-offensive is the mostly likely outcome, but failure or a Russian collapse remain significant possibilities. We should know relatively quickly after the counter-offensive starts whether it will at least be successful, as Ukrainian penetration of the Russian front line defenses or failure to do so will be evident within days.

Kudos

A hearty bravo to Rep. Charlie Conrad for supporting the gender-affirming care bill on the floor. While he opposed it in committee, he listened to the proponents and eventually came to support their point of view. No one comes into office knowing everything. A good public servant listens to his constituents with an open mind. That’s what Charlie did here.

Rep. Charlie Conrad

Hurray for Electric Vehicles! EVs represented 18% of registrations in Portland in February, double the year before. We’ll need to keep up that progress to fight climate change.

Apologies if this missive has a few more typos than normal. Given the time-sensitive nature of the content, I didn’t have as much time to edit it as I would like.